This paper specifies a model of hierarchical planning under risk with imprecise probabilities and utilities. The model is then used to explain how agents might act in ways that are both risk averse and risk avid (i.e. risk seeking).
Introduction
In a theory of hierarchical planning, agents construct relatively 'abstract' or 'coarse' plans of action to attain ends which are also abstractly or coarsely defined. The agents then refine these plans as time goes by and as more information comes to hand; and are ultimately able to construct plans of action that are fully specified at the level of abstraction at which they have to act (Russell & Norvig, 1995, p.380) .
This paper offers a characterisation of hierarchical planning under risk. In the model presented here, an agent starts with a fairly coarsely described decision tree, along with its associated consequences and a set of strategies for getting through the tree. The model then characterises conditions under which the agent might coherently refine those descriptions as more information is revealed to him.
The model is 'naturalistic' in the sense that the agent starts with somewhat 'rough' -'back of the envelope' -estimates of the probabilities and utilities he thinks will obtain; and these measures are made more exact in the light of the new information that is revealed to him about the tree, its consequences and the available strategies. That the agent starts with rough -'order-of-magnitude' -estimates of probabilities and utilities, and that these are subsequently refined by him, seems to capture a natural, real world mode of thinking.
The model of agency that is developed in the paper is then used to demonstrate that agents might be both risk averse and risk avid (i.e. risk seeking) in their behaviour. The model accounts for this phenomenon by showing that an agent might be risk averse at one level of abstraction of a decision problem, but might then be risk avid at a different level. In doing so, the paper offers a novel explanation of the phenomenon under investigation which stands alongside those offered by Friedman & Savage (1948) or the 'gambling-as-consumption' model (Hirshleifer & Riley, 1992, pp27-28) . 
Structural Analysis

Decision trees
The decision-making environment of the agent at any given level of abstraction is a decision tree, which is a tuple: which assigns a probability distribution over the set of subsequent nodes; i.e.,
is the unit simplex with
A strategy, σ ∈ Σ, is the specification of some action, ( ) d s k , at each node of the decision tree. A strategy thus assigns a probability distribution over the set of consequences; i.e. :
. The probability of any node, y, being reached given that σ is played is:
Probabilities are assumed to represent risk.
Decision problems
A decision tree, its consequences and the set of available strategies define a decision problem for the
The agent's preferences over X -denoted ( , ) X ã -are complete, reflexive and transitive; and the ordering is represented by a unique utility function, u(x). The agent also has a probability-weighted function -or 'value' function, v(pr(σ), u(x) ) -which has the expected utility property (i.e.
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) 
Refining trees and consequences
the set of consequences, X α , is an abstraction of X β ; and the set of strategies, Σ α , is an abstraction of Σ β .
A decision tree is an abstraction of another if it preserves the primitive structure of the original (i.e. if it preserves the partial order of nodes) but in a less complex form. Specifically, a decision tree is an abstraction of another if there exists a structural map, Φ: 〈.〉 β → 〈.〉 α which is order-preserving in the sense that: ) ( ) (
(where || denotes non-comparability); and where Φ is surjective.
One set of consequences refines another if each element of the refined description describes at most one element of the original set of consequences to a greater level of detail; and one set of consequences is an abstraction of another if each element of the abstract set describes at least one element of the more refined set to a lesser degree of detail (For example, the set {"a week's holiday in an Italian city"; "a week's holiday in the British capital"} is an abstraction of {"a week's holiday in Rome", "a week's holiday in Florence", "a week's holiday in Venice"; "a week's holiday in London"}). Formally speaking, a set of consequences is an abstraction of another if there exists a map, Π: X β → X α which is semantics-preserving in the sense that: x β ∈ Π (x β ) for all x β ∈ X β , and where Π is a partition operator (and hence surjective).
Finally, we observe that, when ( )
if y β ′ refines y α ′ , then the consequence, x β ′ , delivered by y β ′ is a refinement of the consequnce delivered by y α ′ , namely, x α ′ .
An approximation mapping
In order to understand what it is for one strategy to refine another, and for one strategy set to refine another we first need to canvass the concept of an approximation mapping.
Suppose that there are two domains, Z α and Z β , on each of which are defined the respective value-functions, :
Further, suppose that there exists a surjective mapping, Ω:
approximation mapping if it satisfies the following five conditions:
The approximation mapping describes the loss of information about the value of some entity (z β ) as its description is coarsened (to z α = Ω(z β )). The loss of information engendered by a mapping that satisfies the above four conditions may be more or less severe (and will be the greater, the larger is 6 # β » relative to # α » ). For the hierarchical planning agent, it is important that the loss of information not be so severe that the relatively abstract calculations he undertakes when dealing with relatively abstract decision problems are misleading guides to the more refined calculations he undertakes concerning the value of his actions at finer levels of description. In order to rule out the excessive loss of information through the approximation of values, we add to the above four conditions the requirement that the approximation mappings used by the agent satisfy the following algebra:
Refining strategies
We are now in a position to define how one strategy refines another. A strategy β σ refines a strategy
is the set of minimal elements in the image set of k α , and where Λ(pr(k β )) satisfies the six conditions given above in sec.2.4.
In words, a strategy β σ refines a strategy α σ if the probability of arriving at any node k α ∈ K α given that α σ is played equals the (approximation of the) probability of arriving at the corresponding set of nodes in K β given that β σ is played, and this is so for all k α (where the 'corresponding set of nodes in K β ' is the set:
The upshot of this characterisation of the refinement of strategies is that, at relatively coarse levels of description of the decision problem, the agent is able only to give an 'order-of-magnitude' estimation of the probabilities of arriving at any node in the tree. As the description of the choice problem is refined, so the agent is able to give more exact estimates of the probabilities of arriving at any point in the (refined) tree.
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We further observe that, if every strategy, Σ α α σ ∈ , has at least one refinement, → Σ α , which is generally surjective. The existence of such a mapping rules out the possibility that the agent might discover strategies at more finely described decision problems which he is unaware of at coarser levels of description; and it also rules out the possibility that a coarse plan of action, or strategy, might have no known refinement (and therefore cannot be implemented).
Refining utilities
Utilising the concept of an approximation measure, we can also define how the utility assessment of outcomes at one level of description relate to those at another. This can be straightforwardly stated as:
That is, given that x α is a coarsening of x β , the agent is only able to give an approximate assessment of how much utility x α will bring relative to his assessment of how much x β will bring. Alternatively, once a more refined description of the consequence is given, the agent is able to assign a more exact measure of the utility he will receive from it.
Arguments
We can now establish certain propositions assuming that the statements made in sec.2 hold. In the first proposition, we show that the value of a strategy described at a coarse level of abstraction equals the approximate value of a strategy described at a finer level of abstraction. Specifically, the following is shown to be true. 
∑ ∑ ∑
, which is the desired result.
In the second proposition, we show that the optimal strategy at a coarse level of description is an abstraction of a strategy that is optimal at a finer level of description. have chosen the globally optimal strategy set even though he (locally) maximises. This is the price that is paid by someone who is a hierarchical planner rather than a thoroughgoing Bayesian decision maker -his decisions are only optimal to an order of approximation.
simultaneous risk aversion and risk avidity
Given the above arguments, we are almost in a position to establish our main proposition, namely that agents may act in a way that involves their choosing in ways that can be characterised as both risk averse and risk avid. Before we move on to that argument, we need to tighten up the way in which we refine or coarsen consequences when those consequences are lotteries.
In §2, we defined the abstraction of consequences only in the most general terms. In our argument below, we will want to make use of a stronger definition. In particular, we want to be able to characterise the abstraction of a lottery when that lottery is defined solely in terms of the mean and distribution of returns. It is natural in that context to return to the idea of an approximation function.
Specifically, if we have x α ~ (µ α , var α ) where x α ∈ X α , and x β ~ (µ β , var β ) where x β ∈ X β , and if the semantic map, Π: X β → X α , is a composite of two maps, Π µ ⊕ Π var , one of which maps mean values to an approximation domain, and the other of which maps variances to an approximation domain, then we assume that Π µ has the following intuitive properties: 
In each case -i.e. for both Π µ and Π var -the five properties correspond to properties i-v of an approximation measure.
We are now in a position to demonstrate the core proposition.
Proposition 4. An individual approximate reasoner may behave in a manner that is both risk averse and risk avid.
Proof. (by demonstration) refer to figures 1 and 2. In figure 1 , the agent has, at k 0α , a choice to make between two options, σ 1α and σ 2α , where σ 1α delivers x 1α with probability 1, and σ 2α delivers x 1α and x 2α each with probability ½. Both x 1α and x 2α are lotteries with payoffs in dollars. Lottery x 1α yields a sure payoff of R+ε, with R > 0, ε > 0, and x 2α yields a distribution of payoffs with mean, µ = R and variance, var > 0. On the basis of this information, the agent assigns u α (x 1α ) = 8 and u α (x 2α ) = 10. The agent maximises expected utility and so chooses σ 2α . Given the assumptions on the distribution of payoffs -specifically that the chosen strategy yields the option with the lower mean and higher variance -we can say that the agent is, in this instance, acting in a risk avid manner.
In the decision problem depicted in figure 2 the agent has a choice of three options. σ 11β delivers x 11β with probability 1; σ 21β delivers x 11β and x 21β each with probability ½; and σ 22β delivers x 11β and x 22β each with probability ½. The three consequences are lotteries with dollar-valued outcomes that have the following distributional properties: x 11β ~ (R+ε, 0), x 21β ~ (µ 1 , var 1 ), and x 22β ~ (µ 2 , var 2 ); µ 1 > µ 2 , Π µ (µ 1 ) = Π µ (µ 2 ) = µ; and var 1 > var 2 , Π var (var 1 ) = Π var (var 2 ) = var; The agent then assigns the 12 following utility numbers to these lotteries: u β (x 1β ) = 8.0, u β (x 21β ) = 10.2, and u β (x 22β ) = 10.3. The agent maximises expected utility and so chooses σ 22β . Given the assumptions on the distribution of payoffsspecifically that the chosen strategy yields the combination of lotteries which has a lower mean and lower variance than the only other alternative that is consistent with his or her earlier choice of σ 2α , viz., σ 21β -we can say that the agent is, in this instance, acting in a relatively risk averse manner.
So far, we have observed the agent making relatively risk avid and risk averse choices. To establish the result that a planning agent might act in such a way, we need to verify that the decision problem (〈.〉, X, Σ) β refines (〈.〉, X, Σ) α and that the agent is acting in a consistent manner. It is straightforward to verify that the tree described in figure 2 refines that in figure 1. The map given by:
Φ(k 10 ) = Φ(k 11 ) = k 0 ; Φ(y 11 ) = y 1 , Φ(y 12 ) = Φ(y 13 ) = y 2 is evidently structure preserving. Furthermore,
given the suppositions at the beginning of this section, the set of consequences in figure 2 is a refinement of that in figure 1 . In fact, the convexity requirement combined with the fact that: R+ε > µ 1 > µ 2 and var 1 > var 2 > 0, implies that the the refinement of consequences that is given is unique (i.e.
there is only one possible refinement of the sets of consequences that satisfies the five conditions given at the beginning of this section and which yields a pairwise choice at the higher level of abstraction).
Further, it is evident that σ 11β refines σ 1α , and σ 21β and σ 22β refine σ 2α , so that the set of strategies in the second decision problem (Σ 2 ) is a refinement of that in the first (Σ 1 ); i.e., Γ: Σ 2 → Σ 1 exists. Finally, we can confirm that, as x iα approximates x ijβ , so u α (x iα ) approximates u β (x ijβ ), as is required by the argument in §2.6. This establishes the fact that the agent is behaving in a consistent manner. Hence we have the desired result. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have made use of the idea that agents are approximate reasoners who plan their activity in stages, beginning with relatively coarsely defined plans of action which are then progressively refined time goes by and more information comes to hand. We have used this model to explain how agents might act in ways that are both risk averse and risk avid.
The idea that agents are approximate reasoners seems quite intuitive -people often plan what to do at a relatively abstract level of representation, before determining what to do in detail. The familiar distinction between strategy and tactics implies this mode of reasoning. Moreover, we can readily find instances where people think in just this manner. The person who decides to stay on at University and enter the Law rather than take his chances as a professional tennis player, but who then aims to enter the Bar rather than become a solicitor is behaving as an approximate reasoner who is initially risk averse and subordinately risk avid. Conversely, the person who enters a casino but then steers clear of the roulette wheel is acting in a way that is initially risk avid and subordinately risk averse.
The arguments presented here are thus consistent with observed modes of reasoning, and so provide a novel and realistic explanation of behaviour that evinces an attitude to risk that is simultaneously risk averse and risk avid. Indeed, it is at least arguable that the given explanation of the phenomenon just mentioned is more intuitive and realistic, and has wider application, than those alternative explanations provided by other available models. 
